Towards Pricing Mechanisms for Delay Tolerant Services by Marentes, Luis Andres et al.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS COMMUNICATIONS & CONTROL
ISSN 1841-9836, 11(1):77-89, February 2016.
Towards Pricing Mechanisms for Delay Tolerant Services
L. Marentes, T. Wolf, A. Nagurney, Y. Donoso
Luis Marentes
Department of Systems and Computing Engineering
Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia, South America
la.marentes455@uniandes.edu.co
*Corresponding author
Tilman Wolf
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Amherst, MA, United States
wolf@ecs.umass.edu
Anna Nagurney
Operations and Information Management, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Amherst, MA, United States
nagurney@isenberg.umass.edu
Yezid Donoso
Department of Systems and Computing Engineering
Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia, South America
ydonoso@uniandes.edu.co
Abstract: One of the applications of Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) is rural
networks. For this application researchers have argued beneﬁts on lowering costs
and overcoming challenging conditions under which, for instance, protocols such as
TCP/IP cannot work because their underlying requisites are not satisﬁed. New re-
sponses are required in order to understand the true adoption opportunities of this
technology. Constraints in service level agreements and viable alternative pricing
schemes are some of the new issues that arise as a consequence of the particular op-
eration mode. In this paper, we propose a novel model for pricing delay tolerant
services, which adjusts prices to demand variability subject to constraints imposed by
the DTN operation. With this model we also show how important parameters such as
channel rental costs, cycle times of providers, and market sensitivities aﬀect business
opportunities of operators.
Keywords: Delay Tolerant Networks Pricing, Capacity Management, Economic
Models.
1 Introduction
Networks deployed in low income isolated areas operate in challenging environments char-
acterized by discontinuous power supply and long distance wireless link connections. Their
architectures are adapted to reduce costs, but they are prone to fail due to severe bandwidth
restrictions, an operation highly dependent on weather conditions, and low levels of redundancy
on key elements. These facts lead to intermittent connectivity between end to end points, which
breaks the main assumption for the proper operation of the TCP/IP protocol suite.
The research networking community introduced the concept of intermittent connected net-
works (ICN) to cope with this environment. According to [15], ICN can be deﬁned as:
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An infrastructure-less wireless network that supports the proper functionality of
one or several wireless applications operating in stressful environments, where ex-
cessive delays and unguaranteed continuous existence of end-to-end path(s) between
any arbitrary source-destination pair, result from highly repetitive link disruptions.
The core element is the uncertainty in connectivity partially solved by two mechanisms: store-
and-forward and ﬂooding. In the ﬁrst mechanism, the network’s nodes are capable of storing
data during periods of disconnection and forwarding to other nodes closer to the destination
when a link is established. In the second mechanism, ﬂooding copes with the routing problem.
As nodes cannot maintain origin-destination paths, the network is programmed to send many
copies of the same data towards diﬀerent nodes to increase the probability of reaching the ﬁnal
destination.
For isolated networks the ﬁrst project introducing this concept was [19] with a two-fold ob-
jective: to reduce operational cost using oﬄine data mule connections implemented by existing
transportation methods such as buses, motorcycles, bicycles, etc., and to provide an infrastruc-
ture capable of overcoming interruptions. Then the idea was extended to use mechanic backhauls
and the Delay Tolerant Network architecture (DTN) proposed by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) to handle ICNs [4].
In recent years prototypes such as [5, 9] using DTN or similar architectures have appeared.
Potential operators deploying networks in isolated regions would fulﬁl a mix of delay tolerant and
real time services such as video conferencing for medical procedures. We envision that real time
services are going to be operated using technologies resulting from projects deploying low-cost
infrastructure for cellular networks, see [1,21], or by wireless channels connected to infrastructure
provided by states, i.e, the e-Mexico system [23], the National broadband plan in India [24], the
broadband infraCo in South Africa [22], to name a few.
Although most of these proposals cover technical parts of the network, the economics of the
services being fulﬁlled are not considered. Therefore, their sustainability is strongly compromised.
In economic terms, providers establish service level agreements (SLAs) to oﬀer alternatives re-
garding the quality of services and prices that customers are willing to pay. Right now, these
agreements are based on measures including, but not limited to, packet loss ratio, connection
latency and bandwidth. Once the agreement is established the provider charges services accord-
ing to the rules deﬁned in the SLAs. Nonetheless, potential operators in isolated areas cannot
directly use these measurements; they are based on the assumption of end to end connectivity
which is not guaranteed in the rural environment. So one of the problems faced by these opera-
tors is how to establish SLAs for a diverse set of customers in networks delivering delay tolerant
and real time services.
In this paper we propose, as a ﬁrst step, an integrated pricing and resource assignment policy
for a delay tolerant service. This proposal is based on two service agreement elements and it
optimizes the expected proﬁts from the operator’s point of view. Furthermore, using real data
from a rural network we test the validity of this model to adjust to variability on traﬃc demand
and study its behavior under diﬀerent scenarios.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of
previous proposals on Internet service usage pricing. Section III introduces a novel pricing model
tailored to a delay tolerant service. This model is based on traﬃc management and average time
of delivery. Scenario test-bed settings and results are presented in section III. Finally, section IV
summarizes and concludes the paper.
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2 Related Work
From the introduction of the Internet, authors like [10] have argued the necessity of creating
and using charging models to induce an optimal network resource usage. For Internet connec-
tivity in low income regions, which can be isolated, an optimal resource assignment is even more
important, howsoever, there is no room for light users to subsidize heavy users, nor enough ca-
pacity to deliver non-priority services without aﬀecting high-priority services, the proﬁt enablers
for operators [2]. To the best of our knowledge this paper is the ﬁrst to introduce charging meth-
ods for networks using the delay tolerant architecture. Despite its novelty, the proposal takes
elements of general charging models for the Internet and, in particular, it recaptures conclusions
to increase operator performance under time-variance consumption patterns, see [11, 16, 20] for
an overview of alternative research approaches.
Hande et al [8] introduce models to understand the relationship between the revenues of a
monopolist Internet Service Provider(ISP) and the price sensitivity of users under a two part
tariﬀ. They conclude that in markets with high price sensitivity, normally found in low income
regions, most of the revenues come from the usage based portion of the price. Even more, the
paper suggests that the loss in revenue can be mitigated if the ISP implements charging based on
consumption. Following these conclusions, the proposed model assumes that the ISP collects the
usage part of the tariﬀ and it has previous knowledge of the demand function based on the price
sensitivity. This paper extends the formulation by including quality attributes on the demand
function and costs. These extensions help to provide insights regarding ISP proﬁtability and
service quality experience.
Jian L. et al [12] introduce a price scheme to be implemented by a monopolist operator having
a set of users, whose utilities not only depend on the traﬃc quantity, but on the speciﬁc access
time. They show that the level of revenue extracted by the ISP depends on the information
available. With perfect information, the ISP can extract the maximal revenue. When the ISP
has only information about the traﬃc in diﬀerent time-slots, a more realistic scenario, the loss in
revenue compared with the maximal value is in general not bounded. Contrary to their proposal,
we partially discard the additional utility received by users when access the network in a speciﬁc
time-slot.
The present proposal utilizes a demand changing during the day and forecast prices. We ex-
pect that users being charged move to their preferred time-slot as they know pricing information,
which somehow follows the results presented by [7]. For us, based on an actual deployment, the
authors verify that repeating a game, in which users take into account net prices to decide either
to wait or to use the network, helps not only to decrease congestion periods but to increase the
network usage.
3 Proposed Pricing Model
Operators have two modes for connecting to the Internet. The ﬁrst mode is a real time
connection with cost and bandwidth capacity. Its cost is measured in value per unit of traﬃc
volume and its bandwidth is measured in traﬃc volume per unit of time. The second mode is
a mechanic backhaul connection with a by trip transit time (delivery time), cost, and capacity.
Operators can divide traﬃc in both connections. Users receive in real time part of the content,
for instance the web page’s text, and, after the delivery time, the rest, images and videos. This
way of operation is beneﬁcial for users and providers. Users consume a reduced service instead
of no service and providers increase the use of the network.
Information is relevant to users during a certain period of time. This is closely related to the
value given by users to services, which is partially determined by whether the operator might
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or not deliver the information within that period. Then, the delivery time becomes an intrinsic
quality characteristic for delay tolerant services to be modelled as part of the demand.
In this proposal the idea of Grade of Service (GoS) was adapted to make quality operational
for delay tolerant services. GoS is deﬁned, see [6], as a set of traﬃc engineering variables used
to measure the adequacy of a group of resources to fulﬁl a service under a speciﬁed condition.
An important concept behind GoS is the average behavior, which is used to aggregate the
performance of diﬀerent resources into a unique measure. Following this idea, DTN operators
are interested in measuring the adequacy of the resources (the two connection modes) for user’s
preferences on time of delivery. We propose that operators might use the weighted average time
required to get answers to a user’s request as a measure of the service’s quality.
Our proposed model for pricing delay tolerant services includes price and average delivery time
as factors determining aggregated demand. It creates an optimal policy for price and average
delivery time searching for the maximum amount of proﬁts. In the following subsections we
present the main assumptions: the mathematical representation for the situation being modelled
and the development of its solution.
3.1 Assumptions
Demand
In this paper demand constructions suggested by authors in [3] are used. They ﬁxed the
relationship between demand, price and time by the following linear function.
D(P, T ) = a− βPP − βTT, (1)
where a is the potential market size, βP and βT are the corresponding sensitivity of demand to
price and to delivery time. The potential market size is generalized because demand ﬂuctuates
within the hours of days and between days. We propose a as a function of time, which is
continuous and diﬀerentiable. The end form aggregated demand used in this proposal is:
D(t, P, Tavg) = a(t)− βPP − βTTavg (2)
Costs
The mechanic backhaul connection is charged by a third party. The vendor charges by the
distance travelled and not by how much information is being travelled. From the operator’s point
of view this charge is a ﬁxed cost by trip.
The real time connection is used for fulﬁl priority and non-priority services –delay tolerant
services belong to the second category–, and it has a channel rental cost.
Constant capacity
The model assumes that connections cannot increase capacity dynamically as more demand
is requested from users. The mechanic backhaul capacity is determined by the connection band-
width and the total time that the vehicle is connected to the main gateway.
Constant consumption
Requests generated by users in the network are dissimilar in terms of data to be transferred.
However, the operator needs to establish prices before observing the actual use of the network.
The estimate of the average download and upload consumption is used to charge users. The
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estimate is an input parameter for the model and it is included in the potential market size
function a(t).
3.2 Mathematical formulation
The operator needs a rule that deﬁnes traﬃc going to be served by the mechanic backhaul
connection (F1(t)) or by the real time connection (F2(t)) and the price to charge. See ﬁgure 1.
Each connection has a common set of parameters deﬁned by the tuple (T,C) where T means
time of delivery, and C means cost. The real time connection has an instant capacity K2. The
mechanic backhaul connection has a by trip capacity CAPmb. The operator wants to maximize
proﬁts while maintaining the service mean delivery time (Tavg). The operator cannot diﬀerentiate
among customers willing to pay more for the time provision.
D(t, P, Tavg)
F1(t)
F2(t)
(T1, C1, CAPmb)
(T2, C2,K2)
GW
GW
I(t)
Figure 1: Elements in the general model
The general model could be stated as:
Max
T1∫
0
P (t)(F1(t) + F2(t))− C1F1(t)− C2F2(t)dt
Subject to
I ′(t) = −F1(t) (3a)
I(T1) > 0 (3b)
F1(t) + F2(t) = a(t)− βTTavg − βPP (t) (3c)
F2(t) 6 K2 (3d)
(Z(t)− 1)F1(t) 6 F2(t) (3e)
F1(t) > 0 (3f)
F2(t) > 0 (3g)
P (t) > 0 (3h)
I(0) = CAPmb (3i)
The ﬁrst constraint indicates that the instantaneous change in the backlog of traﬃc going
to be served by the mechanic backhaul connection is equal to the ﬂow using that channel. The
second constraint establishes that the aggregate capacity for services using the mechanic backhaul
connection cannot be more than the capacity available. In particular, this condition must be
true at the end of the cycle time.
The third constraint establishes that demand must go by either of the channels. It constitutes
the relationship between channel use and price and service mean delivery time. Constraint four
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indicates that the quantity of ﬂow using the real time connection must be less than or equal to
the capacity available.
Requests made at time t and using the mechanic backhaul must at least have a travel time
equal to the vehicle cycle time T1. Moreover, when the arrival time coincides with the vehicle
being in transit, it has to wait the remaining cycle time and another cycle. Therefore, the traﬃc
going by the mechanic backhaul as part of a request made at time t must to wait 2T1 − t.
Then, the mean delivery time for services being handled at time t is given by:
L(t) =
(2T1 − t)U1(t) + T2(t)U2(t)
U1(t) + U2(t)
(4)
We can assume that T2(t) = 0 for all t. This measure according to the SLA maintained by the
operator has to be less than or equal to Tavg. Deﬁning the decreasing function Z(t) = 2T1 − t/Tavg
the expression is reduced to the following inequality which corresponds to constraint number
ﬁve. The reader must note that it is valid only for the set {t ≤ T1 : Z(t) ≥ 1}.
(Z(t)− 1)F1(t) 6 F2(t) (5)
Finally, we deﬁne b(t) = a(t) − βTTavg as the function representing the potential market at
time t after discounting the sensitivity of users for the average time.
3.3 Optimal Policy
In this subsection we develop the optimal policy for problem (3). First, the optimal policy
for the formulation without the time average constraint is developed; then as a second step, the
policy is extended to include the average time constraint.
The optimal policy when providers can break the time average constraint
We introduce a new constraint in F1(t) in order to make easier the optimal policy develop.
This constraint limits the amount of ﬂow using the mechanic backhaul connection at any time,
which is written as F1(t) ≤ K1. Multiplier functions θ(t), λ1(t), λ2(t), λ3(t), λ4(t), λ5(t), λ6(t)
are respectively associated with (3a), (3c), F1(t) ≤ K1, (3d), (3f), (3g), (3h) to calculate the
Hamiltonian (H) and Lagrangian (LH), which are, see [14]:
f(t, I, F1, F2, P ) = P (t)(F1(t) + F2(t))− C1F1(t)−C2F2(t) (6a)
g(t, F1) = −F1(t) (6b)
h1(t, P, F1, F2) = b(t)− βPP (t)− F1(t)− F2(t) (6c)
h2(t, F1) = K1 − F1(t) (6d)
h3(t, F2) = K2 − F2(t) (6e)
h4(t, F1) = F1(t) (6f)
h5(t, F2) = F2(t) (6g)
h6(t, P ) = P (t) (6h)
H(t, I, F1, F2, P, θ) = f(.) + θ(t)g(.) (6i)
LH(t, I, F1, F2, P, θ,λ) = f(.) + θ(t)g(.) + λh (6j)
from which we obtain the necessary conditions for optimality:
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LHP = F1(t) + F2(t)− λ1(t)βP + λ6(t) = 0, (7a)
LHF1 = P (t)− C1 − θ(t)− λ1(t)− λ2(t) + λ4(t) = 0, (7b)
LHF2 = P (t)− C2 − λ1(t)− λ3(t) + λ5(t) = 0, (7c)
LHλ1 = b(t)− βPP (t)− F1(t)− F2(t) = 0, (7d)
θ′(t) = −HI = 0, I
′(t) = −F1(t), θ(T1) ≥ 0, θ(T1)I(T1) = 0, (7e)
λ4(t) ≥ 0, λ4(t)F1(t) = 0, λ5(t) ≥ 0, λ5(t)F2(t) = 0, λ6(t) ≥ 0, λ6(t)P (t) = 0, (7f)
λ2(t) ≥ 0, λ2(t)(K1 − F1(t)) = 0, λ3(t) ≥ 0, λ3(t)(K2 − F2(t)) = 0, (7g)
From (7) and integrating θ′(t) = 0 we have θ(t) = θ0. Without loss of generality we are
going to restrict the optimal path to prices greater than zero, so λ6(t) = 0. The reader must to
observe:
1. Assuming C1 < C2, the unconstrained problem has as optimal price P ∗1 (t) = b(t) + (C1 + θ0)βP/2βP .
It is important to note that the function f(t) is strictly concave in the parameter P ,
fPP = −2βP < 0, and it is concave in the parameter F1, Therefore, this value is a global
optimum. Let D1(t) = b(t) − (C1 + θ0)βP/2 the demand corresponding to P ∗1 (t).
2. Because the mechanic backhaul channel has lower cost (C1 < C2), the optimal solution
uses it as much as possible until the point D1(t). Indeed, if K1 > 0⇒ F1(t) > 0.
Now, we calculate the optimal paths as functions of the maximal instantaneous capacity for
the mechanic backhaul K1. All cases are developed in the following paragraphs.
Case 1. K1 > D1(t). The constraint on the mechanic backhaul traﬃc is not binding. From
observation two we have: F ∗2 (t) = 0, λ
∗
2(t) = 0, λ
∗
3(t) = 0, and λ
∗
4(t) = 0. Replacing these
results on the set of equations 7, we can calculate the remaining optimal paths as: F ∗1 (t) =
b(t) − (C1 + θ0)βP/2, λ∗1(t) = b(t) − (C1 + θ0)βP/2βP , and λ
∗
5(t) = C2 − C1 − θ0.
Case 2. K1 ≤ D1(t) and F ∗2 (t) = 0. From these conditions and observation two we conclude
λ∗3(t) = 0 and λ
∗
4(t) = 0. These let us to ﬁnd optimal values for the rest of the functions.
Those values are: P ∗2 (t) = b(t) −K1/βP , λ
∗
1(t) = K1/βP , λ
∗
2(t) = b(t) − 2K1 − (C1 + θ0)βP/βP , λ
∗
5(t) =
2K1 + C2βP − b(t)/βP .
Case 3. K1 ≤ D1(t) and F ∗2 (t) > 0. In this case P
∗
3 (t) = b(t) + C2βP/2βP , F
∗
1 (t) = K1, F
∗
2 (t) =
b(t) − C2βP − 2K1/2, λ∗1(t) = b(t) − C2βP/2βP , λ
∗
2(t) = C2 − C1 − θ0, λ
∗
3(t) = 0, λ
∗
4(t) = 0, λ
∗
5(t) = 0.
Additionally, it is deﬁned D2(t) = b(t) − C2βP/2.
Case 4. K1 +K2 ≤ D2(t). From observation one, the objective function concavity in P (t)
for a given t, and the fact that it is increasing in F1(t) and F2(t) until the point D2(t), it can be
concluded as the optimal decision to assignK1 andK2 to F1(t) and F2(t) respectively. With these
assignments we have λ∗4(t) = 0, λ
∗
5(t) = 0. Replacing this information on the set of equations, we
have P ∗4 (t) = b(t) −K1 −K2/βP , λ
∗
1(t) = K1 +K2/βP , λ
∗
2(t) = b(t) − 2(K1 +K2)− (C1 + θ0)βP/βP , λ
∗
3(t) =
b(t) − 2(K1 +K2)− C2βP/βP .
Case 5. K1 = 0, F2(t) > 0,K2 6 D2(t). The objective function in t is increasing in F2(t) as
long as K2 6 D2(t). Therefore, F ∗2 (t) = K2, λ
∗
5(t) = 0. From K1 = 0, we assign to the multiplier
function λ∗4(t) = 0. Replacing these results in the set of equations and resolving for the rest of
functions, we have: P ∗5 (t) = b(t) −K2/βP , λ
∗
1(t) = K2/βP , λ
∗
2(t) = b(t) − 2K2 − (C1 + θ0)βP/βP , λ
∗
3(t) =
b(t) − 2K2 − C2βP/βP .
Case 6. K1 = 0, F2(t) > 0,K2 > D2(t). From these conditions, then λ∗3(t) = 0, λ
∗
4(t) =
0, and λ∗5(t) = 0. Additionally, replacing these conditions, the optimal paths are: P
∗
6 (t) =
b(t) + C2βP/2βP , λ∗1(t) = b(t) − C2βP/2βP , λ
∗
2(t) = C2 − C1 − θ0.
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The optimal θ0 value is required for all cases, from sub-equation (3a) it is equal to: (where
χ represents the indicator function).
I(T1) =
∫ T1
0
−F1(t)dt =
∫ T1
0
−K1χK1≤D1dt+
∫ T1
0
−D1χK1>D1 (8)
Let AD =
∫ T1
0 b(t)dt the total estimated market during the cycle time. From observation two,
we conclude that operators want to send the maximal value by the mechanic backhaul channel.
In case of enough mechanic backhaul capacity, i.e, AD − C1βPT1/2 ≤ CAPmb, it must be assigned
θ0 = 0 and K1 = max{b(t) − C1βP/2 : t ∈ [0, T1]}. When AD − C1βPT1/2 > CAPmb, the constant
value θ0 can be obtained observing:
1. It can be veriﬁed that proﬁts for cases 1 and 2 are greater or equal than proﬁts for case 3,
whenever 0 ≤ θ0 ≤ C2 − C1.
2. The amount of ﬂow not sent because not enough mechanic backhaul capacity is θ0βPT1/2.
This issue is the result of using the optimal point b(t) − (C1 + θ0)βP/2 instead of b(t) − C1βP/2.
3. From items 1 and 2, we conclude that the ﬂow potentially lost is constrained in [0, (C2 − C1)βPT1/2].
If AD−C2βPT12 ≤ CAPmb ≤
AD−C1βPT1
2 , then θ0 =
AD−2CAPmb
βPT1
−C1 andK1 = max{
b(t)−C1βP
2 :
t ∈ [0, T1]}. If CAPmb <
(AD−C2βPT1)
2 , then θ0 = C2 − C1 and K1 =
CAPmb
T1
must be as-
signed.
The optimal policy for providers with the time average constraint
We use the Lagrangian LH deﬁned in the previous section and include the constraint h4 =
F2(t) − (Z(t) − 1)F1(t). Again, a continuous multiplier function λ7(t) is associated with this
constraint. The necessary optimality conditions for the modiﬁed Lagrangian is given by 7 and:
λ7(t) ≥ 0, λ7(t)(F2(t)− (Z(t)− 1)F1(t)) = 0 (9)
Constraint (3e) is active when F2(t) = (Z(t) − 1)F1(t), Z(t) ≥ 1 and F2(t) is constrained
by K2. Then combining constraints (3e) and (3d) we have K2 ≥ (Z(t) − 1)F1(t). From this
inequality and K1 ≥ F1(t), we conclude that F1(t) is constrained by K2Z(t)−1 as long as this value
is less than K1. Moreover, this value is the binding constraint for F1(t) between the time 0 and
time t1, deﬁned as:
t1 = max
(
0, 2T1 − Tavg
(
K2
K1
+ 1
))
(10)
Now, we complete the optimal policy as a function of the instantaneous capacities K1 and
K2. If the constraint (3e) is active and t ∈ [0, t1], then the optimal policy is the result of the
capacity K2 and the value D3(t) =
b(t)Z(t)−C1βP−C2(Z(t)−1)βP
2Z(t) is attained, which is the maximum
proﬁt. See table 1, where C1 = C1 + θ0. For t ∈ [t1, t2 = 2T1 − Tavg ] the optimal policy is
governed by values K1 and D3(t), see table 1. Finally, for t > t2 the optimal policy follows the
results presented in the previous subsection.
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Table 1: Optimal assignment policy for t ∈ [0, t2]
Case t G(t)∗ P (t)∗ F1(t)
∗ F2(t)
∗ D(t)
K2Z(t)
Z(t)−1
≥ D3(t) t ≤ t
1
(Z(t)−1)(b(t)Z(t)−βP (C1+C2(Z(t)−1)))
2Z(t)2
b(t)
βP
−
G∗Z(t)
βP (Z(t)−1)
G∗
Z(t)−1
G∗ D3(t)
K2Z(t)
Z(t)−1
≤ D3(t) t ≤ t
1 K2
b(t)
βP
−
G∗Z(t)
βP (Z(t)−1)
G∗
Z(t)−1
G∗
G∗Z(t)
Z(t)−1
Z(t)K1 ≤ D3(t) t
1 ≤ t ≤ t2 K1
b(t)−Z(t)G∗
βP
G∗ (Z(t) − 1)G∗ Z(t)G∗
Z(t)K1 > D3(t) t
1 ≤ t ≤ t2
(b(t)Z(t)−C1βP−C2(Z(t)−1)βP )
2Z(t)2
b(t)−Z(t)G∗
βP
G∗ (Z(t) − 1)G∗ D3(t)
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Scenario and parameter settings
Overall performance evaluation is done using the software created for network rural planning
in [17]. The real data presented in [13] and [18] are used as estimators for investment, maintenance
costs, data traﬃc, and elasticities. The evolving potential market size a(t) and the sensitivity of
demand to price βP were calculated for business days and weekends. Data used for simulation
is summarized in tables 2 and 3. Parameters taking values in a range are presented as three
arguments: the initial, ﬁnal, and increment values.
With the proposed pricing model, only one delay tolerant service can be handled. Authors
in [13] report two kinds of traﬃc that potentially could belong to this category: Http and e-mail,
with e-mail being more delay tolerant than Http. Because the same elasticity value is reported
for both services, we can consolidate their traﬃc and manage them as one service. Extending
the model to more than one service and real time technology requires additional control variables
and modifying the inventory constraint. This extension is left for future research.
Table 2: Network general parameters
Parameter Value
Channel(Kbps) 32
Annual investment rate(%) 2,14,6
Monthly fixed cost (Usd) 330
Cost by channel (Usd) 90,170,10
Mechanic Backhaul cost (Usd) 10,70,15
Initial working Hour 6
Final working Hour 19
Cycle time (T1) 7
Time average (Tavg) 7
Investment periods 60
Table 3: Service parameters
Parameter
Delay
Tolerant
Real Time
Elasticity 1.45 1.337
Demand contribution (%) 75 25
βT 0.1,1,0.01 N/A
Base price (Usd/unit) 0.016 0.016,0.05,0.016
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Figure 2: Traﬃc and price behavior
4.2 Results
The evolution of traﬃc by connection and price is presented in Figure 2. The two ﬁgures on
the left show the potential market size and the optimal use of the real and mechanic backhaul
connections. The two cycles are delimited and for each of them the time interval t ∈ [0, t1] in
which constraint 3e is active and determined by K2, and when it is determined by K1, t ∈ [t1, t2].
Traﬃc use is strongly aﬀected by the average time constraint regardless of business days or
weekends. As long as the policy has to use the real time connection, it increases prices to cover
link cost (see right graph). Hence, the optimal demand decreases limiting the network usage.
Once the time constraint is more relaxed, the mechanic backhaul traﬃc increases as well as
optimal demand. In fact, for the hypothetical scenario of T1 <= t2 the maximum mechanic
backhaul connection use is determined by the potential market.
The last sub-ﬁgure in 2 corresponds to the optimal price. As it can be seen the ﬁgure presents
jumps which are the result of changing βP every hour within the days. Explicitly, we ﬁnd the size
of jumps to be proportional to demand changes between hours. From our tests we inference that
maintaining a constant βP eliminates jumps in prices, but under some scenarios decreases proﬁts
for operators. These jumps introduce comprehension complexities for users and operators, so
we argue that maintaining a constant sensitivity to price for weekdays and weekends is the best
decision for the whole system.
Using mixed technologies, the behavior of prices and demand might indicate a cost of real
time channels too high for isolated areas. As this cost decreases, the model starts to decrease
prices and the demand is stimulated for both channels. So we can suggest that mixed providers
could be proﬁtable in areas where WIMAX technologies could be installed ( rental costs less that
90 USD dollars for 32 kbps month).
Second, operators desire to know how traﬃc and income are aﬀected by diﬀerent parameters
used in the model. The impact of average time, cost of the real time connection, and market’s time
sensitivity are presented in Figure 3. If the operator only considers the time average parameter,
his optimal decision would be to increase it as much as possible. However, this decision is correct
as long as users do not have great sensitivity to time, low βT values. If demand is closely related
with time, high βT values, the operator must establish an equilibrium between income gained as
more traﬃc uses the mechanic backhaul connection and the corresponding demand lost.
The real time connection cost is a critical parameter. When the time average constraint is
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active, it determines the optimal demand D3, price, and quantity send by the two connection
types. In the simulated test-bed, the most extreme case is assumed in which the operator has
to use a VSAT connection. Surprisingly, these results indicate that deployment regions closer to
connected Internet areas can beneﬁt from mechanic backhaul connections when services require
high volume traﬃc and users are to a certain degree insensible to delay.
There exists a correlation between real time costs and the traﬃc pattern used. It can be
seen in ﬁgure 3 that a decrease in channel rental costs for business days produces more income
than the same increase in weekends. The demand lost during the interval [0, t1] explains this
outcome, which is the consequence of the variation in the potential market size throughout time.
Therefore, we can conclude the need for using continuous models for adapting policies to demand
variations.
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Figure 3: Change in aggregated results due to parameter shifts
5 Conclusions
We propose a model with price and delay time as demand predictors in which operators
compromise themselves to deliver requests to maximize their proﬁts. The results presented
suggest that continuous models, like the one proposed, are pertinent to establish prices for
delay tolerant services as long as they can handled variability of demand. Contrary to our ﬁrst
assumption, we observed that networks markets located close to Internet connected points can
beneﬁt from these services. Although real time channel lease cost continues to be a critical
factor determining the demand oﬀered to the market, results suggest that mechanic backhaul
connections somehow mitigate the situation. In this paper we do not research, to name a few, the
consequences of monopolistic operators’ behavior, the extent to which sustainability of network
deployments is reached, and the presence of economies of scale. All these research directions
remain open.
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